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ABSTRACT  
Under s.23 of the Mental Health Act 1983 a person can be discharged by the managers of the hospital 
from compulsory care.  The limited evidence indicates that the s.23 power is normally delegated to a 
specially appointed panel who hold a hearing.  Unfortunately, notwithstanding the implications for the 
liberty, autonomy, and dignity of the compelled person, very little is known about how this process 
operates.  Nonetheless, since 1996 there has been a sustained effort to abolish the power.  In view of 
this, the proposal to reform the 1983 Act contained in the Queen’s Speech January 2017, and the 
subsequent establishment of the Independent Review of the Mental Health Act in October 2017, I 
critique the claims made in the abolition debate, and establish the conceptual gaps therein.  I argue 
that a much more developed understanding of the power is required before any change is made to 
the law in this area. 
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In England, in addition to discharge by a Responsible Clinician,1 and the successful application for 
discharge by a Nearest Relative,2 there are two other routes to discharge from compulsory care under 
the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA 1983).  The first is the Mental Health Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’). The 
Tribunal sits in panels of three members, is chaired by a legal professional, and benefits from the 
presence of a medical wing member.  A compelled person can request a Tribunal hearing once in any 
detention period; it is a periodic power of discharge.3  The second is a Hospital Managers’ hearing 
under s.23 MHA 1983 (‘the Managers’).4  Like the Tribunal, the Managers tend to sit in panels of three,5 
assess the written and oral evidence received against the relevant admissions criteria that justify 
compulsory care,6 and provide reasons for their decision.7  There are restrictions on who can be 
                                               
1 Mental Health Act 1983, s.23(2)(a)-(c). 
2 ibid., see also s.25. 
3 A table of eligibility periods is provided by Mental Health Law Online 
<http://www.mentalhealthlaw.co.uk/Eligibility_periods> accessed 6 September 2017. 
4 Throughout the paper the panel considering the use of s.23 are referred to as ‘the Managers’, capitalised as 
written.  They can almost always be distinguished from the managers of the hospital, the hospital managers (not 
capitalised).  See further, Section II below. 
5 See R (T-T) v The Hospital Managers of the Park Royal Centre [2003] EWCA Civ 330 [4], [9], [26] (Pill LJ); [29-
30] (Laws LJ); [36-37] (Arden LJ); and in the High Court [2002] EWHC 2803 Admin [8], [27] (Forbes J); the 
legislation also specifies a minimum of three persons, MHA 1983 s.23(4). 
6 This varies depending on the order in question, see Department of Health (DH), Mental Health Act 1983: Code 
of Practice (London: HMSO, 2015) paras. 38.11-38.23. 
7 On the requirement for Managers to give adequate reasons see R (O) v West London Mental Health NHS Trust 
[2005] EWHC 604 (Admin) (‘O’); and on their quality, R (SR, by her Litigation Friend) v Huntercombe Maidenhead 
Hospital v MR (Nearest Relative) [2005] EWHC 2361 (Admin) especially [22]-[30] (‘SR’); Mental Health Act 




appointed in terms of their independence,8 but there is no statutory requirement that those appointed 
as Managers possess any legal or medical expertise.9  Unlike the Tribunal, a person can request a 
hearing as many times as practicable in any given detention period; it is a continuing power. 
In this paper I examine the arguments made in support of and against, the effort to abolish the s.23 
mechanism between the mid-1990s and the passage of the Mental Health Act 2007 (MHA 2007).  My 
main aim is to challenge the poor quality – on both sides – of the evidence provided in support of 
these arguments, and thus critique the way in which the question of abolition has been handled by the 
legislative process.  In so doing I touch upon discussion of the wider history of the Managers’ powers, 
the relationship between the Managers and the Tribunal, and a number of other matters of interest 
vis-à-vis the Managers, but my observations are necessarily confined to my examination of the 
approach to reform.  It should also be borne in mind that, although the abolition debate appeared to 
end with the passage of the MHA 2007, leading commentators have continued to call for the abolition 
of the Managers’ s.23 power.10 Taken in conjunction with the government’s willingness to resume the 
effort of reforming the MHA 1983, it is evident that s.23 abolition remains a live issue.11  However, as 
I discuss in what follows, abolition of s.23 is inadvisable.  This is not because a positive case can be 
made for not doing so.  Instead, it is because there is such a paucity of evidence regarding how the 
s.23 process operates, who sits as a Manager, and the policies relating to the administration of the 
                                               
2.93-2.94.  On the giving of reasons by the Tribunal see JLG v Managers of Llanarth Court & Secretary of State for 
Justice [2011] UKUT 62 (AAC),  [3(v)], and also [6]-[9] (‘JLG’). 
8 DH (n 6), paras.38.6-38.7. 
9 But note ibid., para.38.8. 
10 For example, R. Jones Mental Health Act Manual (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2016), v-vi. 
11 Queen’s Speech, full text at <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-2017> accessed 6 
September 2017; and the Independent Review of the Mental Health Act, details at < 





power by NHS trusts and independent hospitals (administration of the system is devolved to individual 
organisations).12  Furthermore, there is little case law,13 and the understanding of s.23 in Parliament is, 
at best, mixed.14  The same can also be said of the professions.15  In consequence, efforts aimed 
towards either retaining or abolishing s.23 are undermined by the present impossibility of supporting 
them with anything more than assertion and anecdotal evidence.  Against this backdrop the Managers 
are rendered ‘relatively invisible’,16 and as such it is not possible to make a positive case for either 
abolition or retention of s.23, and so I will not do so. 
The fact that the s.23 power has largely escaped academic, parliamentary, and judicial consideration, 
might lead one to believe that it is a relatively minor outcrop in the landscape of mental health law.  
Such a view would be incorrect.  Although it is not known how many hearings take place a year, the 
government estimated that over 10,000 s.23 hearings were held in 2003/04, a similar figure to the 
number of tribunals convened.17  On any measure this entails a significant volume of quasi-judicial 
activity, and gives some sense of the scale of the s.23 process.  Unfortunately, this estimate was not 
                                               
12 A fact highlighted, but not elaborated upon in P Gregory, ‘Who can best protect patients’ rights?’ (2000) 24 
Psychiatric Bulletin 366-367, 366-367. 
13 An almost complete list can be found at 
<http://www.mentalhealthlaw.co.uk/Category:Hospital_managers_hearings> accessed 6 September 2017. 
14 See section IV(A) below. 
15 See A Fraser and M Winston, ‘NHS managers and clinical management’ (1992) 16 Psychiatric Bulletin 567-568; 
P Power-Smith and M Evans, ‘Managers Tribunals’ (1993) 17(1) Psychiatric Bulletin 47-48; Gregory (n 12); H 
Kennedy, ‘Managers’ hearings: dialectic and maternalism’ (2000) 24 Psychiatric Bulletin 361-362. 
16 P Bartlett and R Sandland, Mental Health Law: Policy and Practice (Oxford: OUP, 4th edn, 2014), 503. 
17 This has to be deduced from the headline figure by subtracting the number of tribunal hearings (12,735) from 
the total combined number of Managers’ and Tribunal hearings (22,800) in Joint Committee on the Draft Mental 




based on any data because ‘no formal statistical returns for [Managers’ hearings]’ are collected.18  
Furthermore, the only other information available on the intensity with which s.23 is used are the 
limited data which were occasionally gathered by the Mental Health Act Commission (MHAC).19  The 
Care Quality Commission (CQC) does not appear to have gathered any data, and only occasionally 
mentions the Managers in their annual reports.20  Whatever the precise figure, given that the number 
of uses of compulsory powers under the 1983 Act has increased year-on-year over the last decade, it 
is likely that there has been a concomitant increase in s.23 activity.21  Having regard to the probable 
scale of the activity concerned – no one contested the government’s 2004 estimate – and the particular 
gravity of the issues involved – no less than the liberty, autonomy and bodily integrity of individuals – 
s.23 represents anything but a minor issue.  In view of this, and the fact that the debate has hitherto 
been conducted in the absence of either a conceptual framework, or data, my arguments in this paper 
                                               
18 DH evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill in Volume II: Oral and Written Evidence, 
(Session 2004-05, HL 79-II/HC 95-II), EV491; MHAC also stated it did not gather data, see MHAC, Twelfth 
Biennial Report 2005-2007: Risk, Rights Recovery (London: TSO, 2007), para. 4.96; but cf Correspondence on 
Gregory (n 12), published unsigned in (2001) 25(6) The Psychiatrist 237-238.   
19 Examples include MHAC, Eighth Biennial Report 1997-1999, para. 4.88 which stated that 3,598 hearings were 
held in 1997/98; and MHAC (n 18), fig. 55, p.180; local data may have been gathered, see C Williamson and C 
Vellenoweth,  Directors Guide: Duties of managers for the review of detention under the provisions of the Mental Health 
Act (London: National Association of Health Authorities and Trusts, 1996), p.23; also C Williamson, Members’ 
Information Pamphlet No.2: Hearing patients’ appeals against continued compulsory detention (Birmingham: National 
Association of Health Authorities, 1985), 12-13; C Williamson, NAHAT Information Pamphlet Number 1: Hearing 
patients’ appeals against continued compulsory detention (United Kingdom: National Association of Health 
Authorities and Trusts, 2nd edn, 1991), 17. 
20 For example CQC, Monitoring the Mental Health Act in 2014/15 (London: HMSO, 2015), 59. 
21 CQC, Monitoring the Mental Health Act 2015/16 (London: HMSO, November 2016), 18, showing year-on-year 




are as much an invitation to proponents of both positions to pause ahead of the possible legislative 
reconsideration of the matter,22 as they are a critique of their claims. 
With these issues in mind, it is now possible to consider the three sites of contention in the abolition 
debate. First, that the Managers lack expertise; secondly that they are not independent, and, finally, 
whether the process duplicates the efforts of the Tribunal.23  I will examine the serious weaknesses in 
the evidential base underpinning debate in these areas below.  However, in view of the Managers’ 
‘invisible’ character, a brief discussion of their nature and history is warranted. 
II THE HOSPITAL MANAGERS AND THE EFFORT TO ABOLISH 
THEM 
Due to historical reforms which, viewed today, seem to have been designed to confuse the uninitiated 
from the outset,24 the Managers tend not to be the managers of the hospital.25  Instead, the available 
evidence suggests that they are normally specially appointed by the organisation – the managers – who 
then delegate the s.23 power to review the legality of compulsory care to those persons – the 
Managers.26  Thus, a hearing before the Managers does not constitute an appeal against compulsory 
care, instead they review the decision of the clinical team and consider whether to exercise a 
                                               
22 Queen’s Speech (n 11). 
23 These claims are a common feature of all abolition arguments, but are most succinctly encapsulated in DH, 
Improving Mental Health Law: Towards a New Mental Health Act (Cm 6305) (London: HMSO, 2004), para. 3.58. 
24 See section IV(A) below. See also South Staffordshire and Shropshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust, Dr 
Whitworth v The Hospital Managers of St George’s Hospital v AU [2016] EWHC 1196 (Admin), [19] (Cranston J) 
(‘AU’). 
25 See DH (n 6), chapters 37 and 38. 




delegated, discretionary power to discharge.27  They make a decision on behalf of, not a 
recommendation to, the delegating organisation.28  Consequently, the Managers’ review process exists 
outside of the tribunal system and, as such, the only recourse open to those dissatisfied with the 
decision of the Managers is judicial review by the High Court.29  Alternatively, given the continuing 
nature of the s.23 power, it is always open to the compelled person to make a fresh s.23 hearing 
application.  Beyond this, it is sufficient for now to say that the Managers’ discretionary power allows 
them to discharge persons from numerous compulsory care provisions against medical advice,30 even 
where the criteria permitting compulsory care provided in the 1983 Act are met.31  It is the sine qua 
non of a decision to exercise the Managers’ s.23 discharge power that it runs contrary to professional 
medical opinion.32 
The origins of the parliamentary effort to abolish the Managers can be found in the statement on 
mental health services made by the then Secretary of State for Health, Stephen Dorrell MP, to the 
Commons in February 1996.33  He discussed, inter alia, the ‘disquiet about the arrangements that allow 
                                               
27 See A Eldergill, Mental Health Review Tribunals Law and Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), 144; see also 
MHAC, The First Biennial Report of the Mental Health Act Commission 1983-1985, para. 8.13. 
28 See Williamson and Vellenoweth (n 19), 16-17. 
29 Alternatives, such as one Managers’ panel overturning the decision of another may be problematic, see MHAC 
(n 18) para. 4.95; the application must also be made to the High Court, not the Upper Tribunal, see AU (n 24) 
[40] (Cranston J).  
30 DH (n 6), para. 38.2. But see also section III(B) below. 
31 See R v Riverside Mental Health Trust, ex parte Huzzey [1998] 43 BMLR 167, p.173 (Latham J) (‘Huzzey’), see 
also SR (n 7) [19]-[20]. 
32 N Turner, HyperGuide to the Mental Health Act, News Items, 18 September 1996, <https://web-
beta.archive.org/web/19970716201321/http://www.hyperguide.co.uk:80/mha/news1.htm> accessed, 16 August 
2017. 




hospital managers to discharge patients from detention’.34  He focussed solely on the example of Glen 
Grant, who was released from Cane Hill Hospital, Surrey.35  Grant had been convicted of multiple, 
violent crimes, which took place shortly after a panel of Managers discharged him from hospital against 
medical advice.36  Dorrell established a Working Group to consider the operation of the discharge 
power,37 and stated that he hoped that their recommendations would enable him to propose ‘adequate 
safeguards [re s.23] to command public confidence’.38  Debate on the statement when it was repeated 
in the House of Lords was less measured.39  Lord Strabolgi, for example, decried ‘the so-called 
anonymous lay [Managers]’ who ‘have overruled the views of professional doctors’, and demanded 
‘Who are they? Why are they allowed to remain anonymous? Why are they allowed to overrule the 
professionals?’40  There was also some confusion as to the legal basis of the Managers’ power.  At one 
point the minister, Baroness Cumberlege, seemed to suggest that, whereas the Tribunals’ power was 
contained in the MHA 1983, the Managers’ was not.41   
The Working Group’s Report, published in July 1996, was at most agnostic about the removal of the 
s.23 power, conceding only that future consideration should be given to whether having two routes 
                                               
34 ibid., c.176. 
35 According to Turner (n 32); other sources suggest he was discharged from Broadmoor, see D Brindle ‘Mental 
health “lay” appeals to be axed’, The Guardian, 18 September 1996; for other examples of incidents following 
release by Managers see Fraser and Winston (n 15) and Power-Smith and Evans (n 15).  
36 Turner (n 32). 
37 MHAC, National Association of Health Authorities and Trusts (NAHAT), NHS Federation, Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, Working Group Report on Managers’ Review of Detention Under the Mental Health Act (July 1996). 
38 Dorrell (n 33) c.185; see also Baroness Cumberlege, HL Deb 20 February 1996 vol 569 c.1001. 
39 Lord Hayhoe’s brief intervention is the exception, HL Deb 20 February 1996 vol 569 cc.1003-1004. 
40 Lord Strabolgi, HL Deb 20 February 1996 vol.569 c.1001. 




of challenge was ‘beneficial’.42  However, although the Secretary of State had said he intended to be 
guided by the Group’s findings,43 his proposals were more forthright.44  He did not feel that there was 
‘a valid role for lay managers in this area’.45  The basis of his argument was that, because of the 
‘completely separate’ tribunal route, the Managers’ power was apt to ‘create confusion for patients 
and duplication of effort [for professionals]’.46  The Secretary of State promised to legislate to abolish 
the power. 
In the event, the Conservative Party lost the 1997 General Election and the impetus behind the 
abolition effort faltered.  However, in October of the following year the Labour Government 
established an Expert Committee to review the legislation relating to mental health.47  Chief among 
the Committee’s recommendations, when it reported in 1999, was the creation of a ‘multi-disciplinary 
tribunal’ which would authorise and review the legality of the initial medical decision to detain shortly 
after it was made.48  In view of the creation of a new version of the Tribunal, the Committee concluded 
that the Managers should ‘cease to be a feature of future mental health legislation’.49  Echoing the views 
of the former Secretary of State for Health, the Committee contended that because the purported 
                                               
42 MHAC et al (n 37), 10-11. 
43 Dorrell (n 33) c.177. 
44 Issued in a press release on 17th September 1996. The full text of the statement is available via Turner (n 32). 
45 ibid.  
46 ibid.; the situation was probably not helped by conflation of terminology, for example Power-Smith and Evans 
(n 15) 47-48; and that some authorities set up the managers as a ‘shadow Tribunal’ see S Blumenthal and S 
Wessely, The pattern of delays in Mental Health Review Tribunals (London: Department of Health, HMSO, 1993), 
para. 4.2.4. 
47 Richardson Committee, Report of the Expert Committee Review of the Mental Health Act 1983 (London: HMSO, 
November 1999), ‘The Expert Committee’. 
48 ibid., paras. 16-24. 




duplication of effort ‘tended to impose considerable burdens on the clinical team’, while producing 
‘little obvious benefit to the patient in terms of early discharge’, and because the dual route for review 
was ‘confusing for patients’, the power should be abolished.50  The Committee failed to provide 
evidence to substantiate their claims.51  However, it did acknowledge that there was some support 
for the continuation of the Managers’ role because it provides ‘an important lay element’ as well as ‘a 
link with the local community’ in ‘a uniquely informal’ setting that allows ‘the patient … to hear the 
opinion of the care team’.52 
The White Paper, Reforming the Mental Health Act, as well as the draft Bill and consultation documents 
that were published in 2002, also demonstrated support for an independent tribunal and the removal 
of the Managers.53  Again, however, the evidential basis for these claims was limited.54  This is 
unsurprising given the brevity of the discussion regarding the Managers in the White Paper.55  The 
2002 Bill was opposed on many fronts, though not because of the proposals relating to the Managers.  
The government took time to reconsider their position and in 2004, again reflecting the 2002 Draft 
                                               
50 ibid., paras. 5.127-5.128; a view supported by the government, see DH, Reform of the Mental Health Act 1983: 
Proposals for Consultation (Cm 4480) (London: HMSO, 1999), paras.7.8 and 10.6. 
51 For limitations of the 1996 Working Group’s evidence (n 37) upon which some of the claims may have been 
based, see sections IV(B) and V below. 
52 Expert Committee (n 47), para. 5.128; see further Williamson (1985) (n 19), 3-4; Williamson and Vellenoweth 
(n 19), 17-18. 
53 Home Office and DH, Executive Summary to Reforming the Mental Health Act – Part 1: The new legal framework 
(Cm 5016) (London: HMSO, 2000), para. 7.7; DH, Mental Health Bill Consultation Document (Cm 5538-III) 
(London: HMSO, 2002), para. 2.3. 
54 ibid., Home Office and DH, para. 9. 




Bill and the arguments made by the Expert Committee, returned with new proposals which retained 
the aim of removing the Managers’ s.23 powers as part of the creation of a new tribunal.56 
The 2004 Bill proved to be ill-fated and was followed by a more modest amending Bill in 2006.57  In 
the interim, all efforts to abolish the Managers’ s.23 power appear to have fallen by the wayside, though 
criticism of the power had continued in the background.58  The Managers’ only appearance in the 2006 
Bill, later the MHA 2007, was a clause to correct a previous legislative oversight in relation to NHS 
foundation trusts and s.23.59  Having briefly outlined the context in which the effort towards securing 
abolition has taken place, I will now consider the first of the abolitionists’ contentions, the question of 
the Managers’ expertise. 
III EXPERTISE 
Before the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill (the Joint Committee) in 2004 the Institute 
of Mental Health Act Practitioners (IMHAP) observed that one of the central requirements for a 
person to be considered eligible to sit as a Manager was that they should have ‘suitable experience 
and qualifications’.60  The government has also acknowledged that that the Managers generally do 
possess relevant ‘experience and expertise’.61  Nevertheless, this has not prevented proponents of 
abolition, including the government, from promoting the assertion that ‘the “lay” managers usually 
                                               
56 DH (n 23), paras. 3.57-3.58. 
57 Government Statement available in J Roll and M Whittaker, House of Commons Library, ‘The Mental Health 
Bill [HL] Bill 76 of 2006-2007’, Research Paper 07/33, 15-17. 
58 Independent Review into the Care and Treatment of Mr Anthony Hardy (September 2005) (‘Hardy Review’), 
paras. 7.6.1-7.6.7 
59 See MHA 2007, s.45; also section IV(B) below 
60 IMHAP in evidence to the Joint Committee (n 18), EV101. 
61 Home Office and DH (n 53), para. 7.7; see also DH (n 23), para. 11.15; but note MHAC, Seventh Biennial Report 




have no mental health background or experience’.62  For abolitionists, “lay person” can mean either a 
person who is neither medical doctor nor a legal professional, or specifically not a psychiatrist.  The 
arguments of both those in favour of and opposed to abolition can, at present, have little status beyond 
that of conjecture because there are no publicly available statistics detailing the educational and 
professional background of those sitting as Managers, and so it is not possible to say whether the 
Managers are “lay people” in the sense of having no relevant professional experience of mental health 
or law.  The opponents of abolition fare a little better as regards principled justifications for offering 
an alternative process to the Tribunal, for example, that it is community orientated,63 but their claims 
are otherwise similarly underdeveloped and not supported by evidence. 
Additionally, the proponents of abolition have never been clear about what they mean by expertise.  
It is therefore necessary to discern what is meant by “expertise” in this context.  In short, two 
conceptions of expertise emerge from the arguments made in the abolition debate.  First, that the 
relevant experience which qualifies a person to sit as a Manager, when coupled with the specific 
training undertaken, and experience gained by participating in the s.23 process, render that person an 
expert in that process.64  Alternatively, that only those specially trained in specific professions – law 
and medicine – possess the necessary expertise to enable them to consider whether discharge is 
appropriate.65  The former view enables a wider category of persons to participate in the decision-
making process, whereas the latter confines this to the legal-medico professional sphere.   
                                               
62 Kennedy (n15); also Blumenthal and Wessely (n 46), para. 4.2.4; but see AU (n 24), [10] (Cranston J); and 
Williamson and Vellenoweth (n 19), p.18.   
63 IMHAP (n 60), EV101. 
64 For example, Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust in Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill, 
Volume III: Written Evidence, (Session 2004-05, HL 79-III/HC 95-III), EV1023-EV1024; see also IMHAP (n 60), 
EV101; AU (n 24), [10] [33-34] (Cranston J); JLG (n 7), [7]. 
65 See, for example, DH (n 23), paras. 3.54-3.58; Joint Committee (n 17), Annex 4, Clause 35(a), Government 




III(A) Expertise in Risk Assessment? 
Although abolitionists question the expertise of the Managers in general, which, as I have said, is difficult 
to assess in the absence of evidential support, their specific concern regarding expertise is directed 
towards whether the Managers are capable of properly assessing risk.  The germ of this claim is found 
in the events surrounding Grant’s aforementioned release in 1996.66  At the time, the criticism directed 
at the Managers was especially concerned with their failure to keep the public safe from harm due to 
a purported inability to assess risk.67  The implication was that, whereas psychiatrists and lawyers are 
regularly required to make an assessment of risk as part of their professional duties, and so have 
extensive experience in this area, the Managers are not, and so do not.  Of course, it is inaccurate to 
say that psychiatrists and lawyers always arrive at the right decision, or that, once they have reached 
a conclusion they are implacably opposed to amending it.  This much was demonstrated by Peay’s 
research which showed that the behaviour of professional mental health decision-makers, and the 
conclusions they draw change when they interact with colleagues.68  For example, social workers and 
psychiatrists considering whether discharge or the renewal of compulsion is appropriate demonstrate 
‘a range of strategies’ when negotiating decisions on renewal of compulsory care.69 
There is nothing nefarious about professionals changing their mind in response to discussion, indeed 
the MHA 1983 requires consultation between professionals.70  Nonetheless, Peay’s research 
demonstrates that although psychiatric professionals claim that they alone are ‘imbued with the 
                                               
66 See again, (n 35), and Dorrell (n 33) 
67 R Pacitti, 'Political Footballs? Stephen Dorrell's threat to the hospital managers' (1997) 83(Jan/Feb) Openmind 
6-6, 6; see also comments from Jim Callaghan MP and Dorrell’s reply, HC Deb 20 February 1996 vol. 272 c.185; 
and Lord Strabolgi (n 40), c.1001 giving a sensationalist example of ‘dangerous mental patients [who] have been 
allowed back into the community, without adequate supervision, to murder and rape.’ 
68 J Peay, Decisions and Dilemmas: Working with Mental Health Law (Oxford: Hart, 2003), 63. 
69 ibid., 62. 




necessary “exclusive” expertise’, the value of the social worker’s professional views on 
‘appropriateness [of compulsory care] and best practice’, are also important.71  Such views, like those 
of numerous other categories of professionals involved in mental health care, are informed by 
experience in deploying their expertise in particular contexts.  The interaction of these views 
necessarily requires negotiation since different professional groups do not understand the MHA 1983 
in the same way.72  Thus, while professional expertise is a necessary component in assessing suitability 
for compulsion or discharge, and by implication the risks associated with such a decision, Peay’s 
research indicates that it is inappropriate to confine consideration to medical expertise alone.  With 
this consideration of the behaviour of professional decision makers in mind, I can now turn to consider 
the question of risk. 
When recommending compulsory care, or the continuation of it, the care professionals must be of 
the opinion that, inter alia, the person poses a risk to the safety of themselves or others.73  As such, 
the ability to assess risk is an integral, though conceptually challenging,74 component of the review 
process.  The question of assessing the Managers’ ability to gauge the risk of harm is made more 
complicated by the categories of persons who can be reviewed by the Managers.  On the one hand, 
the Managers are not permitted to review the compulsory care of those under s.37/41 restriction 
orders, only the Tribunal may do this.75  However, this does not mean that the Managers are prevented 
from reviewing the compulsory care of individuals who are claimed to be “dangerous”.  An individual 
subject to compulsory care under s.3 MHA 1983 for example, can be discharged by their Nearest 
                                               
71 Peay (n 68), 65; for further discussion and expansion see Nicola Glover-Thomas and Judith Laing, 'Mental 
Health Professionals' in Lawrence Gostin, Peter Bartlett, Phil Fennell, Jean McHale, and Ronnie Mackay (eds.) 
Principles of Mental Health Law and Policy (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 275-324. 
72 ibid. Peay, 79. 
73 See, for example, MHA 1983 s.3(2)(c); Huzzey (n 31), 173 (Latham J); and DH (n 6), paras. 38.15-38.23. 
74 E Perkins, Decision-Making in Mental Health Review Tribunals (Gateshead: Policy Studies Institute, 2003), 67-68. 




Relative.76  To prevent this, the Responsible Clinician can issue an s.25 barring order indicating that 
the patient would pose a danger (a higher threshold than a risk) to themselves or others.77  The 
appropriateness of this order, and thus the claim of dangerousness, may then be reviewed by the 
Managers.78  Similarly, the Managers may also review the compulsory care of individuals who came 
into the mental health system from the criminal justice system via a s.37 order;79 that is, forensic, but 
not restricted patients.  Thus, the Managers may, like the Tribunal, encounter individuals posing a 
serious risk to the safety of themselves or others.  On the one hand this demonstrates the importance 
of considering whether the Managers can properly assess risk, while on the other it shows that this 
aspect of the review mechanisms available under the  MHA 1983 are somewhat incoherent. 
Of course, fixating on risk in the abstract may be inappropriate.  Speaking before the Joint Committee, 
IMHAP argued that focussing on the Managers’ ability to assess risk was wrong, because risk could 
never be eliminated, ‘no amount of new legislation can improve foresight’.80  Instead, IMHAP called for 
a focus on the benefits of having multiple review routes.  They argued that the impact on risk to others 
from eliminating the Managers’ powers would be ‘minimal’, and would be ‘outweighed by the 
protection afforded to citizens’, that is, the reduction of the risk that the rights of those subject to 
compulsory care would be overridden.81  In any event, in a rebuttal to the contention that Managers 
were poor judges of risk, IMHAP argued, albeit without empirical evidence, that the Managers ‘have 
an excellent record in terms of risk when compared to consultants or patients’ responsible medical 
officers and Mental Health Review Tribunals’.82  Additionally inquiries into instances where tragedy 
                                               
76 This power is also to be found in s.23 MHA 1983. 
77 See further Huzzey (n 31), 173 (Latham J); SR (n 7), [4-7] (Jackson J). 
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has followed discharge by the Managers have similarly indicated that the Managers are competent to 
make reasonable judgments about risk, provided the care professionals make available the information 
necessary to make an informed decision.83  Unfortunately, little evidence exists to justify either the 
contention that the Managers represent a significantly riskier safeguarding process than the 
alternatives, or that they are less risky. 
We might also consider that, if experience in assessing risk is valued, then experience of conducting 
reviews may improve the ability of a reviewer to assess risk.  The case law supports this position, 
suggesting that the Managers’ value lies partly in their experience of conducting reviews.  The courts 
have indicated that because the task of the Tribunal, and by implication that of the Managers who apply 
the same statutory criteria, is of a relatively repetitive nature, this will breed a degree of expertise as 
regards ‘the nature of [the] task’.84  That is, once a decision-maker grasps the requirements of the 
review, they are able to participate in the process in a way that ensures the care team are made to 
appropriately justify their decision to continue compulsory care.  Consequently, it can be argued that 
reviewers gain competence to independently weigh the expert evidence put to them and the question 
of risk against the legal criteria by virtue of their on-going experience of conducting reviews.85   
Although these arguments do not necessarily support the view that Managers are the best equipped 
people to make these decisions, it calls into question the abolitionists’ claim that specific professional 
expertise is required to review decisions.86  In the absence of empirical evidence to enable a 
comparison of the ability of, for example, the Tribunal and the Managers to assess risk, it is not 
presently possible to justify the position of either side.  While each might have some anecdotal 
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evidence based on their individual experience of how effectively they have assessed risk in the past, 
no comprehensive picture exists.  
(III)(B) A More Expert Tribunal? 
The argument in the first part of this section has shown that there is currently no way to distinguish 
between the risk-assessment abilities of the professionals, the Tribunal or the Managers.  A separate 
abolitionist contention is that the Tribunal is more expert than the Managers.  In demonstrating that 
this argument is logically flawed, I will show that conceptually there is, at minimum, the potential for 
the Managers to possess the requisite expertise to conduct reviews of compulsory care under the 
MHA 1983. 
As I noted at the start of section III, abolitionists argue that the Managers lack the expertise to 
challenge the clinician authorising compulsion because they are not themselves experts in the field of 
mental health medicine; they are not clinicians.87  This argument overlooks the membership of the 
Tribunal which, although there have been changes in the scope of the powers accorded to it, has 
remained stable in terms of its composition since it was established under the Mental Health Act 1959 
(MHA 1959).88  Thus, if medical expertise is a prerequisite for effective review, this must also disqualify 
the legal and third member of the Tribunal from interrogating the evidence presented by the 
Responsible Clinician (and, arguably, the other professional report authors).89  The same logic could 
be applied to the proposition that legal expertise is a prerequisite for understanding the legal 
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framework.90  Quite where the abolitionist argument leaves the (so-called) lay third member of the 
panel is unclear. 
The abolitionists are thus seeking to subscribe to two contradictory propositions, only one of which 
can be true.  First, each member of a tribunal is capable of interrogating the legal and medical evidence 
offered by the care team, can do so on the basis of their own expertise and experience, and is not 
reliant on the views of the medical or legal member respectively.91  Or, secondly, that only the relevant 
professional member is capable of interrogating the discipline-specific evidence presented, for example 
by the clinician, and so all conclusions reached by the Tribunal about the accuracy of, for example, the 
clinician’s medical opinion are de facto the sole conclusions of that member.  If the former proposition 
is preferred, then it must also be concluded that anyone with suitable experience is capable of 
interrogating the legal and medical evidence.  If the latter is preferred, then the process is a charade 
in which one professional opinion competes with another.  What is more, it implies that the third 
member is there merely to make up the numbers.  Put this way, the proposition that medical expertise 
is essential, and that no other knowledge is appropriate appears a little farcical, and is out of line with 
the expectations of tribunals established by the Leggatt Review.92 
The unattractive illogic of the latter proposition suggests that the former should be preferred in the 
absence of contrary evidence.  The MHA Code of Practice (the Code) appears to be in agreement with 
this view.93  While the Code states that the Managers ‘will not normally be qualified to form clinical 
assessments of their own’, the same paragraph indicates that they will be required to ‘reach an 
independent judgment based on the evidence that they hear’ and that if there is disagreement among 
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the care professionals, they may ‘seek further medical or other professional advice’.94  Any 
disagreement between the original and additional opinion can only be resolved by the independent 
judgement of the Managers.  Such a statement is, at minimum, a tacit acknowledgment that the 
Department of Health accepts that the Managers are qualified to assess professional opinion. 
Notwithstanding that the logic of this aspect of the abolitionist argument is flawed on its own terms, 
it also requires the acceptance of a false premise.  That is, the terms of the argument misconstrue the 
nature of the legal context.  If one steps outside of the unrealistically narrow conditions established 
by the Tribunal/Managers dichotomy – that to prove their worth, the Managers should be compared 
to the Tribunal – two things become clear.  First, that even if the Managers lack specific expertise in 
mental health, or the law, lay people are accorded significant powers elsewhere in the legal system, 
for example, in the magistracy and jury system.  Secondly, it is also a mere assertion that the Managers 
are lay people who possess insufficient professional experience, given that we know very little about 
their composition.  Both on its own terms, and when viewed in a less contrived context, the 
requirement of expertise set for the Managers as compared with that expected of the Tribunal is 
untenable. 
Although those speaking in defence of the Managers’ power have met the criticisms made of them 
regarding the expertise of the panel members with little concrete evidence, the same is true of those 
opposed to the Managers’ exercise of the s.23 discharge power.  Furthermore, no evidence has been 
offered which rebuts the proposition that the Managers are capable of producing good decisions, in 
the sense of decisions being aware of the relevant risks, reasoned, rational, and proportionate.  This 
is not to say that professional expertise is not also essential; both the Tribunal and the Managers rely 
on the details provided by each of the report authors to give them access to all the information needed 
to reach a decision, but the available evidence does not show that a narrow understanding of 
professional expertise (law or medicine) is essential to understanding whether an argument for 
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continued compulsory care satisfies the legal requirements of the MHA 1983.  In consequence, relying 
on this argument to support legislative reform in this area cannot be justified. 
IV INDEPENDENCE 
The positions assumed by both abolitionists and their opponents demonstrate that it is difficult to 
substantiate either view of the Managers’ expertise.  Arguments have also been made on two other 
grounds: independence and duplication.  The independence argument is less straightforward than that 
concerning expertise.  This is because the parliamentary understanding of the Managers’ position 
relative to the managers was, as I will show below, unsettled from 1990 until 2007.  This situation was 
likely both created and subsequently compounded by the failure of Parliament to articulate either the 
practical or principled basis for the independence of the Managers’ created by the statutory 
framework.  Notwithstanding this absence, the Managers’ independence has been presented by 
proponents of the power as an important reason for retention.95 
Taken in conjunction with the wider ignorance about the Managers, the lack of either a concrete or 
conceptual basis for their independence is problematic.  For example, it made it possible for the 
government to argue that because the hospital managers are the body authorising compulsory care, 
they could not be independent for the purposes of review.96  The government failed to recognise that 
there is a difference between the hospital managers and the Managers, but their claim went 
unchallenged.  The oversight was convenient because at the time the government were proposing that 
the Tribunal should become the body responsible for authorising and reviewing compulsory care.  
Their claim about the supposed lack of distinction between the Managers and the managers allowed 
the government to present the old system as flawed, and the new system as better, because it would 
be carried out by an independent judicial body.  The lack of a principled and practical understanding 
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of the Managers’ role thus permitted the government to avoid acknowledging the contradiction 
between their statement about the Managers’ independence, and the proposal to combine 
authorisation and review into a single process. 
As the central contention of this paper is that we should not make significant changes to the framework 
of safeguards in the MHA 1983 without properly understanding the systems we seek to alter, I propose 
to explore the official understanding of the Managers’ independence with a view to unpacking the 
implications of it for the abolition debate.  I do not propose to enter into debate about the substantive 
value of such independence, because that presupposes that we have a clear understanding of the extent 
to which s.23 practice deviates from the official understanding, which we do not.  Instead, I seek to 
establish what independence they are thought to have under the MHA 1983.  This entails considering 
two things.  First, having regard to the legislative development of the s.23 power, is the direction of 
travel towards growing independence on paper?  Secondly, if yes, what is the purported nature of that 
independence? 
IV(A) Historical Development of Independence 
It has not always been the case that the managers and the Managers were separate entities.  In view 
of the fact that the s.23 discharge power, and earlier incarnations of it were always exercised locally, 
the precise moment of transition from relative overlap to relative separation between managers and 
Managers varied depending on local circumstance as much as the legal framework.  However, as I 
discuss below, by the time with which I am concerned in this paper, the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, 
the transition was largely complete.  To understand how the legal framework established a space for 
independence in principle, it is necessary to briefly consider the origins of the s.23 discharge power. 
It is often contended, incorrectly, that the origins of the Managers’ s.23 power lie in the MHA 1959.97  
In fact, the power of discharge today exercised by the Managers historically attached to the Justices of 
                                               




the Peace in Quarter Session who, as part of their responsibilities for administering what passed for 
local government in the nineteenth century, sat on the Visiting Committees of the local county 
asylums.  The Justices were not only closely implicated in the administration of the asylums,98 but also 
possessed a power of discharge.99  At the time it was also the function of the Justices, as magistrates, 
to certify persons as suitable for admission to an asylum.  In this way, those authorising admission, 
continuation of compulsory care, and discharge were one and the same, and cannot be said to have 
been independent.  The motivation behind providing the Visiting Justices with a power of discharge 
likely had little to do with safeguarding individual rights, but rather, as with their other powers, the 
administration of public funds associated with the asylums.100 
Little changed following the passage of the Local Government Act 1888 and the Lunacy Act 1890.  The 
1890 Act transferred the powers held by the Visiting Justices to the County Councils created by the 
1888 Act, including responsibility for administering asylums as well as exercising a power of 
discharge.101  Many of the members of the County Council Visiting Committees were Justices who 
had previously sat on the old Visiting Committees, and who were then re-appointed as ex officio 
members of the County Councils.102  There may have started to be some disaggregation from the 
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County Council as a consequence of the Mental Treatment Act 1930, which permitted individuals who 
were neither elected nor ex officio members of the County Council to be co-opted onto the Visiting 
Committees,103 but there was inconsistency between localities here.104  However, the 1930 Act 
marked the first time that the independence of those who were not involved in the management of 
the hospital, but had the power to discharge them, was made legally possible. 
The National Health Service (NHS) Act 1946, which created the NHS, removed the power of 
discharge from the local authority Visiting Committees, but only to transfer it, along with other powers 
and responsibilities including the administration of mental hospitals,105 to Hospital Management 
Committees (HMCs).106  The MHA 1959 retained this arrangement.107  Like the Visiting Committees 
before them, HMCs were ultimately responsible for the day-to-day administration of the hospitals, 
and could delegate their authority to sub-committees, including to co-opted external members.  It 
remains unclear whether those reaching decisions about exercising the power of discharge were also 
involved in hospital administration, again, local practice is likely to have varied because of the lack of 
centrally promulgated guidance, but the power to delegate was certainly available.108   
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The 1959 and 1983 MHAs replicated the position under the NHS Act 1946 and its predecessors, albeit 
in a consolidated form, including the ability to delegate the discharge power to a sub-committee.109  
Although the discharge power contained in s.47 predated the MHA 1959 Act, the Report of the Percy 
Commission (1957) was evidently concerned at the lack of detail surrounding how it was to be 
executed.  To this end, the Report went into some detail about how the HMC procedure should be 
structured, at least as regards the question of renewal orders, which were to be conducted by 
interview.110  It is not clear, however, whether it was anticipated that this procedure would also extend 
to challenges to compulsory care made outside of the renewal cycle.111  Notwithstanding the 
consideration given by the Commission, the limited evidence suggests that the procedural 
requirements of the regime under the s.47 MHA 1959 were limited.  A Review undertaken prior to 
the passage of the Mental Health (Amendment) Act 1982 (MHAA 1982) and the MHA 1983 indicates 
that, although s.47 was thought to provide ‘an important safeguard’,112 there was wide variation in 
each Area Health Authority (AHA) as regards procedure, appointment of external Managers, and the 
involvement of both AHA managers and appointed Managers in reaching a decision.113  Indeed, when 
the possibility of reforming the MHA 1959 was under consideration in the late 1970s, the Government 
thought it would be necessary to establish a formal procedure, in part to combat the aforementioned 
variation in practice.114 
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It is not clear whether this concern resulted in any noticeable change in practice, though the continued 
devolution of the power to the most local level, coupled with the lack of guidance on these procedural 
aspects, to the present day, makes the likelihood of any change having occurred slim.  There is a lack 
of data regarding whether delegation took place in practice following the passage of the 1983 Act, 
which itself echoed the wording of the MHA 1959 provisions,115 and contemporaneous official sources 
are in dispute with one another as to whether delegation was permitted.116 As such, it is again difficult 
to establish whether delegation to external independent persons occurred.  The confused picture in 
the years following the passage of the MHA 1983 may have been due to the failure of Parliament to 
consider the Managers’ discharge power during the passage of the MHAA 1982,117 and the lack of a 
standardised procedure for carrying out hearings.118 
However in the first half of the 1990s, the picture became a little more settled with the evident 
expectation that delegation to external persons was ordinary.119  Nonetheless, while delegation 
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occurred, this does not mean that those in receipt of the delegation were independent of those 
delegating s.23 authority.  For example, there was no requirement in the first or second editions of 
the Code that those exercising the s.23 power should be independent of the compelling authority.120  
Furthermore, although the principle was included in the third edition,121 the emphasis in the text was 
on the final decision resting with the compelling authority.122  Taken in conjunction with the patchy 
practice of delegation throughout the twentieth century, the development of the Code in the 1990s 
would appear to support the abolitionist contention that the Managers are not independent.  In 
particular, that they appear to lack decisional independence123 – the ability to make decisions free from 
external influence.  However, this view is confounded by the contemporary practices described in 
Hansard. 
An examination of the parliamentary record indicates that, from at least 1990, Parliament’s intention 
was understood to be that individual organisations gave the Managers decisional independence.  In 
two periods, 1990-1994 and 2003-2007, the Managers were not independent of the managers.  
However, Parliament’s reaction to this state of affairs indicates that this was not the intended position.  
Before exploring this further, two caveats must be noted.  First, the legislation only affected those 
organisations which had transitioned to the new administrative structure created by the Acts in 
question.124  Second, and more significantly, although within the two periods, as I show below, 
Parliament’s legislative actions suggest it intended that the Managers possess decisional independence, 
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in the years between 1994 and 2003 and especially in 1996, Parliament took a different view when 
debating the Managers.125  This suggests that Parliament’s intention was unsettled throughout the 
period from 1990 to 2007. 
The root cause of the difficulties between 1990-1994 and 2003-2007, lies in the failure to amend s.145 
of the MHA 1983 to reflect administrative changes to the structure of the NHS.  As enacted, s.145 
provided that a hospital was an organisation operating under the NHS Act 1977,126 and defined the 
managers of the hospital as the corporate body itself.  This definition is relevant because only those 
fulfilling these criteria, and those to whom the power can be delegated, can exercise the MHA 1983 
s.23 power.  Thus, who or what constitutes a manager is important.  In 1990 and again in 2003, the 
NHS underwent reorganisations which had the effect of creating new organisations (managers) not 
covered by s.145.127 
The NHS and Community Care Act 1990 (NCCA 1990) created, among other things, NHS trusts 
with boards that included Non-Executive Directors.128  In view of previous reorganisations, one would 
have expected the 1990 Act to have replicated the existing authority to delegate s.23 powers, and to 
have amended the definition of ‘manager’ in s.145 MHA 1983 accordingly.  Yet, buried within Schedule 
9 of the 1990 Act lay three seemingly innocuous words – ‘the directors of’ – to be inserted into s.145 
MHA 1983.129  The amendment was presented with a collection of other amendments as ‘minor 
changes to existing legislation consequential on the setting up of [NHS] trusts’;130 a housekeeping, 
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continuity amendment.131  The amendment was subsequently considered summarily and left to stand 
when the Lords’ amendments were returned to the Commons.132 
The words had far-reaching consequences.  In view of the historical format of s.145, the specification 
of trust directors, not the trusts themselves, as the Managers, and the absence of any indication that 
the authority could be delegated, the only way to read the words was to require that the directors 
personally carry out the s.23 process.  Following a written question from Liz Lynne MP, the then Under-
Secretary of State for Health John Bowis MP responded that primary legislation would be necessary 
to correct the ‘problem’.133  From 1990 until the passage of corrective legislation in 1994,134 the three 
words created severe difficulties for the Chairs and Non-Executive Directors of all NHS trusts treating 
people under the 1983 Act.135  There were only a handful of such managers in each trust,136 and they 
had other responsibilities connected with its administration.  Unsurprisingly, the shortage of persons 
authorised to use the s.23 powers caused considerable delays in holding hearings in some 
organisations.137  The Mental Health (Amendment) Act 1994, removed the phrase ‘the directors of’ 
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and so allowed the trusts as corporate bodies to be defined as the managers, reflecting earlier 
practice.138 
What is important about these changes, beyond the evident lack of proper legislative scrutiny, is the 
unintentional, but palpable shift the NCAA 1990 appears to have caused in ordinary practice.  
Previously, not only was it possible to delegate the power to specially appointed persons, as suggested 
above,139 but it appears that Parliament thought it ordinary to do so.140  This conclusion is only further 
confirmed by Parliament’s reaction to the consequences of the NCCA1990.  Hansard details the 
various difficulties that arose ‘owing to a mistake in the drafting of Schedule 9.’141  For example, in 
some trusts the problems were so extensive that Non-Executive Directors ‘had to leave their sickbeds 
to conduct appeals’.142  Parliament’s legislative response amending s.145 shows that it had always 
intended that the new trusts would be in the same position as their predecessor authorities.143  
Regrettably, lessons were not learnt from the 1990-1994 debacle.  Schedule 4 paragraph 53(c) of the 
Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003 inserted new material into s.23 
of the 1983 Act which explicitly, and inexplicably, distinguished NHS foundation trusts from all other 
forms of hospital organisation as regards defining the manager.  Once again the provisions prevented 
anyone but the Chair and Non-Executive Directors from exercising the s.23 discharge power.  An 
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opportunity to correct the problem was missed in the passage of the NHS Act 2006.144  Instead, 
Schedule 7 paragraph 15(3) of the 2006 Act restated the position under the 2003 Act. 
Confirmation that it had not corrected the issue can be seen during the Second Reading debate in the 
House of Lords on the new Mental Health Bill 2006.  During the debate, Baroness Meacher was moved 
to lament that there was: 
… an urgent need to deal with the unsustainable position of foundation 
trusts that cannot delegate the functions of Mental Health Act managers 
from non-executive directors. That is a small technical point, but one that is 
causing absolute havoc around the country.145 
Evidently no one disagreed with Baroness Meacher because the amendments to correct the difficulty 
enjoyed an undisturbed passage throughout the rest of the parliamentary process.146  As in 1990-1994, 
the 2003-2007 difficulties indicate that Parliament understood ordinary practice to be that the hospital 
managers tended to delegate responsibility to specially appointed Managers. 
In these two periods it is clear that the legislative intention of Parliament regarding ss.23 and 145 MHA 
1983 was understood as being that the Managers were independent of the organisation delegating the 
s.23 power.  Nonetheless, Parliament’s intention was unsettled when the whole period from 1990-
2007, taking in the events of 1996,147 is considered.  Had either side in the abolition debate examined 
the variability of Parliament’s intentions in more detail, this might have provoked a more substantive 
                                               
144 Royal assent 8th November 2006, in force from 1st March 2007. 
145 Baroness Meacher, HL Deb 28 November 2006, vol.687 c.708; see also MHAC (2005-2007) (n 18), paras. 
4.98-4.100. 
146 The last mention of the relevant provision, Clause 44, is to be found in the House of Commons Public Bill 
Committee on 15 May 2007 at c.389.  The provision was dealt with summarily alongside Clauses 45 and 46 and 
left to stand as part of the Bill.  The correction to the legislation can be found in MHA 2007, s.45. 
147 See Section II, above 
31 
 
discussion about the principled justifications for Parliament’s variable position; Hansard discloses no 
such consideration.  As I have emphasised throughout my examination of this debate, both sides are 
hampered by the lack of evidence and a conceptual framework to support their claims.  This is likely 
to be both a cause as well as a consequence of the unsettled parliamentary picture in this period. 
Taking an even wider historical perspective, from 1990 to 2016, it can be seen that while Parliament’s 
intention may have appeared to be unsettled in the 1990s, because of the discussion in 1996 regarding 
Grant and the establishment of the Working Group, this was something of an aberration.  Following 
the passage of the MHA 2007, s.45 of which corrected the difficulties caused by the 2003 Act regarding 
delegation in foundation trusts, it appears that the parliamentary position is that the managers may 
delegate the s.23 power to external persons.  The 2016 judgment in AU not only confirms that s.23(6) 
specifically enables delegation in foundation trusts, but that the parliamentary intention behind s.23 as 
a whole was to establish ‘an independent decision-making entity’ to which power could be delegated.148  
Although the court did not reflect on the fact that s.23 does not itself preclude hospital managers 
from acting as Managers, the court’s interpretation of the statute indicates that where the power is 
delegated the body should be independent of the organisation.  Whatever the precise implications of 
AU for managers, the broader legislative and judicial view indicates that delegation of power is ordinary, 
and that the purpose of this is to establish decisional independence. 
IV(B) Independence in Practice 
The foregoing discussion establishes the route by which the practice of delegating discharge authority 
to external persons has become normal practice, though neither Parliament nor any other body has 
presented any justification for this course of action.  Furthermore, notwithstanding the official position 
reinforced by the MHA 2007 and the judgment in AU, it remains unclear whether the Managers 
capitalise on their apparent independence in practice.  Independence in this context requires more 
                                               




than a theoretical capacity for decisional independence, it requires that Managers are able to form an 
independent view that meets the requisite legal standard in practice.149 
To answer this question it is again useful to begin with some historical context.  The ability of those 
exercising the s.23 power, or its earlier incarnations, to think independently of medical professionals 
was not considered a desirable feature by the Macmillan Commission (1926), the Royal Commission 
which preceded the Mental Treatment Act 1930.  The Commission stated that the Visiting 
Committees should be ‘guided largely by the advice of the medical superintendent’ when considering 
discharge.150  This was not a radical position.151  Thirty years later, the Percy Commission, which 
informed the MHA 1959, took a different view and, in the context of a discussion around the creation 
of the Mental Health Review Tribunal, considered that reliance of HMCs on the advice of the medical 
superintendent was problematic should the patient require a formal legal justification for their 
compulsory care.152  However, seen in the light of the wide powers of discharge that the Commission 
argued should continue to vest in the HMCs,153 their criticism might be seen as a call to strengthen 
the independence of HMC members.  
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The Percy Commission’s views were not universally accepted.  Some of the contributions to the 
parliamentary debates which followed their 1957 Report suggested that lay persons (i.e. non-
psychiatrists) should not be permitted to exercise an independent judgement.  Reginald Sorensen MP 
(unsuccessfully) asserted that if lay persons were allowed to be independently minded, the result would 
be ‘lamentable’. Instead, he argued that ‘the doctor must be relied upon to give advice which laymen 
should accept’.154  This was a more extreme position than the already high-bar proposed by the 
Macmillan Commission, which had recommended (also unsuccessfully) that only the unanimous 
approval of the whole Visiting Committee, rather than the ordinary panel of three, would be sufficient 
to override the decision of the doctor.155  Quite what purpose would be served by having the clinician’s 
view reviewed by persons who would ultimately have to defer to the clinician was not explained.  
More recently, it has been recognised that deciding to discharge against medical advice ‘is virtually the 
definition of a discharge at a Managers’ hearing’.156 
This historical summary gives some sense of the tensions involved in the exercise of the s.23 power, 
but it does not tell us whether the Managers typically do override the decision of the clinician today.  
In the absence of other evidence, the best available indicator of the Managers’ ability to form an 
independent view are the rates of discharge by Managers.  Unfortunately, even on this fundamental 
point, only very limited statistical evidence is available.157  The first of the sources available is the 
Report of the 1996 Working Group.  The Group conducted a study involving a small, though nominally 
representative, number of hospitals and concluded that ‘the number of patients discharged against 
medical advice … is very small (5 per cent)’, with even fewer discharged following an s.20 MHA 1983 
renewal (‘2 per cent’).158  This figure is in keeping with that reported by IMHAP before the Joint 
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Committee in 2004 that ‘approximately 3-4% of hearings’ result in the lifting of the section.159  It is 
regrettable that the statistical evidence to support IMHAP’s claim was not produced.160  The picture 
is further confused in view of the fact that the figures of both the Working Group and IMHAP are 
lower than those produced by MHAC for 1997-1998 (8.4 per cent discharge rate at contested 
hearings).161 
Each of the figures above is limited by the fact that they provide only a snapshot and disclose no sense 
of the trend over time.  A study by Singh and Moncrieff is more chronologically comprehensive.162  
Their study covered 1997-2007, but it did not distinguish between those discharges granted by the 
then Mental Health Review Tribunal and those by the Managers.  As such, it is hard to discern which 
element of the total discharge rate recorded, approximately 12 per cent, is attributable to the 
Managers.163  Although there is inconsistency between each of the studies discussed, they all suggest 
that the rates of discharge are lower than we might expect if Managers were regularly challenging the 
views of clinicians.164 
This conclusion is simplistic because it ignores other factors which may explain the low rate of 
discharge.  First, none of the studies recorded the number of discharges following a request for a 
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hearing but preceding the hearing itself.  One anecdotal, though dated, example of discharge ahead of 
a requested hearing is discussed in Hansard,165 but more recent, comprehensive statistical data is 
limited.  The only publicly available example is an MHAC study of five service providers in 2006/07.166  
The study indicates a discharge rate at hearings of 5 per cent from 443 hearings, a similar figure to 
those above, but it also says that 195 discharges were made prior to the hearing.  Taken with other 
figures in the table, the total number of requested hearings was 732, it can be seen that in 
approximately 27 per cent of cases, a patient was discharged prior to their hearing, but following a 
request for a hearing.  This undermines the contention of the Expert Committee and the government 
that the s.23 process is of ‘little obvious benefit to the patient in terms of early discharge’.167  If a 
request prompts a clinician to discharge a person from compulsory care, this suggests that they 
perceive the Managers to constitute an informed, reasonable decision-making body that, given access 
to the same evidence as the clinician, is capable of reaching the same conclusion that a person no 
longer meets the criteria for compulsory care.  In the event that a clinician were not to discharge a 
person, a body which was not capable of thinking independently would be unlikely to reach such a 
decision, and would instead rubber-stamp the clinician’s view. 
Secondly, it should be acknowledged that while requests might be made for s.23 hearings, some of 
these will have little prospect of success.168  A person who lacks sufficient insight into their mental 
health may bring a weak case, leading the Managers to agree that compulsory care should continue.  
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Added to this is the assumption that all professionals are acting in good faith, and have cogent, 
evidenced reasons to make the case for compulsion.  Thus, in addition to their safeguarding role, the 
Managers’ hearings also serve as a means to locate those cases where an inadvertent error in reasoning 
has been made, or where a case falls into the grey area where either a decision to discharge or to 
continue compulsory care could be justified.169 
These observations of the probably operational parameters of the Managers’ s.23 power yield only a 
relatively narrow range of cases likely to lead to discharge.  On the other hand, given it is estimated 
that many thousands of Managers’ hearings take place annually,170 a 3-5 per cent discharge rate at 
hearing, plus a substantial number of discharges following a request for a hearing, amounts to many 
hundreds of cases a year.  This is significant when it is considered that every such case represents a 
decision to protect the liberty of the person subject to compulsion.  Taken together with the 
expectation that the decision-making power will often be delegated to external persons, the possible 
discharge rates by the Managers suggest that they possess many characteristics that render them 
independent.  At this stage however, it is only possible to say that the abolitionist contention that the 
Managers lack independence as regards their personnel and decision-making capacity is in doubt.  We 
need more information about who sits as a Manager, and how the s.23 process operates before we 
can compare them to, inter alia, the Tribunal and Responsible Clinician’s discharge power, and thus 
take a more considered view as to what reform of the statutory framework, if any, is required.  What 
should be noted though is that the above only considers the outcome of the Managers’ process, and 
not the possible value of the process itself, which is addressed in the next section. 
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From the foregoing discussion it is clear that, primarily due to a lack of data and other evidence, 
understanding of the s.23 power is limited.  This has led to underdeveloped, often unsubstantiated 
claims regarding both the independence and expertise of the Managers, and poorly informed 
arguments being made whenever reform is contemplated.  This difficulty also afflicts the third limb of 
the abolition argument: that the Managers duplicate the process and, thus, the effort of the Tribunal.171  
As I said above,172 while the Tribunal and the Managers appear to share certain procedural 
characteristics, this does not preclude the possibility that they are substantively different.  In 
consequence, although abolitionists could point to the Report of the Working Group which found 
that 68 per cent of those subject to compulsory care applied to both mechanisms,173 this figure 
oversimplifies the duplication question. 
First, the Group did not explore why two purportedly duplicative processes had been permitted to 
continue to co-exist despite major reform – the passage of the MHA 1983.  The membership of the 
Group was such that it was well-placed to speculate on this point, even if it could not provide concrete 
answers.174  Raising these questions may have provoked the kind of substantive consideration of the 
purpose of review mechanisms under the MHA 1983 which I have already demonstrated has not 
occurred.  Secondly, the Report oversimplifies the nature of a person’s mental health.  The fact that 
68 per cent of those subject to compulsion surveyed used both mechanisms says nothing about when 
their applications to each were made.  If they were not proximate in time, then the fact that they 
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applied to both mechanisms is unlikely to have caused any duplication, because a person’s mental 
health is dynamic and so may change between hearings, requiring new reports to be produced.175 
Finally, the Group did not interrogate the reasons why a person might apply to both processes.  The 
absence of investigation suggests that the Group assumed that because the procedure and nature of 
the power are superficially similar – in that both permit discharge – the value and purpose of the routes 
to the individual and to the legal system must be substantively the same.176  In view of the fact that 
neither society nor the legislative process, have ever considered the intended function of the s.23 
discharge power, nor that of its antecedents, this assertion is difficult to substantiate.  In consequence, 
the figure of 68 per cent offered by the Report does not provide a complete picture.  To further 
demonstrate why this is the case these limitations can be examined in more detail.  This will show 
that, to date, the duplication argument has been presented in a binary way, when the situation is 
considerably more nuanced. 
V(A) A More Local Power 
I have already shown above that the s.23 power predates the earliest incarnation of the Tribunal.  
Furthermore, if the deliberations of the Percy Commission are examined, it is possible not only to 
reconfirm that what became the Managers’ power of discharge predates the 1959 Act, but also that a 
specific concern was expressed that the proposed tribunal would duplicate the discharge power 
possessed by the Managers’ (then HMCs’).177  The tribunals proposed by the Commission, and found 
in the 1959 Act, were based along the geographical boundaries of the 14 Regional Hospital Boards 
created under the NHS Act 1946.  They were in this sense local, but decidedly less so than the HMCs 
which were associated with individual hospitals or groups of hospitals within a Board’s area.  The 
Commission was concerned about the legitimacy of a body with a jurisdiction covering a larger 
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geographical area to exercise a continuing power of discharge equivalent to that of the HMCs.  Indeed, 
this may be the historical reason why the Tribunal and its predecessors were entrusted only with a 
periodic power of discharge, even if today the practicalities of case management are likely the main 
factor.178  In the light of modern contentions that the Managers duplicate the functions of the Tribunal, 
it is ironic that the Tribunal created under the 1959 Act was not imbued with a continuing power of 
discharge because it was thought that they would be seen as duplicating the role of a more local 
body.179  This suggests that the type of power exercised by the Managers and the Tribunal was 
historically intended to be different, at least in terms of the locus of their legitimacy. 
While this shows that historically the difference between the two powers was concerned with issues 
of local legitimacy, this does not preclude it from being viewed as a procedural, case management issue 
today.  Thus, the modern understanding of the nature of the two powers merits some further 
examination.180  In AU Cranston J concluded that the apparent intention of ‘the Parliamentary design 
is to confer wholly separate discharge powers’ on the Tribunal and Managers,181 such that one need 
pay no attention to the other.182  This difference would be of little consequence if a Managers’ hearing 
and a tribunal are scheduled to be held close together, because the criteria applied by each is the same.  
In anticipation of the concern that proximity in time would duplicate the liberty safeguarding element 
of the process, the Code stipulates that the Managers have a discretion not to hold a hearing or, 
impliedly, to defer holding a hearing if the Tribunal ‘has recently considered the patient’s case or is 
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due to do so in the near future.’183  Procedurally, therefore, there is a means to avoid unnecessarily 
holding review hearings.  There is no data available on how frequently a refusal to hold a hearing on 
temporal proximity grounds occurs. 
Taken in combination, the fact that the Percy Commission considered that the nature of the legitimacy 
of the Managers’ established, and the Tribunal’s proposed powers should be different, and that the 
Code provides a framework to avoid duplication, suggests that the situation is more complex than the 
abolitionists’ duplication objection implies.  However, given that it is the Managers’ s.23 power that 
has been the target of abolition attempts, it is worth examining whether the implementation of s.23 
has the potential to produce value that the Tribunal cannot, in order to justify the claims of those in 
favour of retaining s.23. 
V(B) The Nature of the Process 
Whatever the apparent difference in the nature of the discharge powers, abolitionists could argue that 
the means by which the s.23 power is implemented – the nature of the process – provides credence 
to their duplication claim.  Superficially, the two routes are the same.  Both require the same written 
reports, hear oral evidence, sit as a panel, and make decisions on the same criteria.  However, just 
because both mechanisms employ what is a functionally similar process with similar possible outcomes 
does not mean that they have the same value and meaning in substantive terms, or that the power is 
exercised for the same purpose.  To understand why the abolitionists claim is potentially problematic, 
it is helpful to consider two aspects of the Managers’ operational context.  First, proponents of 
retaining the s.23 power contend that the Managers are a locally orientated body with a particular 
interest in supporting their community.  Secondly, they claim that the Managers represent a less formal, 
more accessible process for the individual subject to compulsory care, which may be considered 
                                               
183 DH (n 6), para. 38.13; also R (on the application of Zhang) v Whittington Hospital [2013] EWHC 358 (Admin), 
[44] (Geraldine Andrews QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge). 
41 
 
important in view of the power disparity between them, and those exercising powers under the MHA 
1983.  
In its evidence submitted to the 2004 Joint Committee, the Hospital Managers’ Committee of the 
North East London Mental Health Trust (NELHMC) said that the Managers’ continuing power of 
discharge enables them to follow up on the long-term care of patients, and to ensure that progress is 
being made on their care, because they could instigate a hearing on their own initiative.184  They stated 
that the independent, though somewhat collegial position of the Managers relative to the organisation 
being reviewed allowed them to ‘exert pressure’ to secure funding for care from the compelling 
authority where the Tribunal was thought to be ‘unwilling to do so’, though examples of what this 
might entail were not given. The Managers’ motivation for undertaking such activities was attributed 
to their ‘local community interest,’ which the Tribunal, as a centrally regulated process, was said to 
lack.185 This assertion was not rebutted by those arguing for a Tribunal-only system.  Nor, though, did 
proponents of retaining s.23 articulate why being less local should make one disinterested in compelling 
an organisation to provide appropriate care promptly. The tension between the relative values of 
centralised, standardised operations and local, community-responsive decision-making can only be 
debated when more is known about the how the Managers operate locally.186 
Those in favour of retaining Managers’ hearings have also argued that they afford the compelled person 
the opportunity to ask questions of their care team, to hear questions put by the Managers, and to 
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have those questions answered.187  The implication is that the Tribunal process, while it might permit 
the panel members to challenge the care team, does not necessarily enable the compelled person to 
participate.188  Additionally, while the Expert Committee did not endorse the view, it noted that some 
of the witnesses appearing before it argued ‘that a [Managers’] hearing provides a uniquely informal 
occasion at which the patient is able to hear the opinion of the care team’.189  Conversely, it has been 
argued that, the risk of moving to a Tribunal-only system, as was proposed in 2004 and as must be the 
implicit aspiration of those in favour of abolition of the Managers’ power, is that the process could 
become ‘more formal, more adversarial, more rooted in the rules’ and that this ‘will tend to exclude 
the patient’.190 These are not trivial concerns.  The legal process must be sensitive to its context, and 
be conscious that at the centre of the legal framework is a person subject to, or at risk of being subject 
to, compulsory medical care.  Just as the value of preventing inappropriate compulsion through 
formalised judicial protection is high, so too is the ability of the individual person to engage with that 
process.191  A process which is too legalistic, and inhibits the participatory opportunity that the 
Managers’ hearing purports to represent, may doubly disempower individuals, leaving them excluded 
by both legalism and their subordination to the powers of the MHA 1983.  Of course, due to a lack 
of data, it is difficult to assess the extent to which individuals are empowered and supported to speak 
at Managers’ (or Tribunal) hearings, or how often, and why they do not attend.  It is similarly unclear 
whether people are regularly supported by relatives, Independent Mental Health Act Advocates, legal 
representatives or others. 
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Notwithstanding the limited empirical basis for such a claim, it appears that the Managers may have a 
separate value to their purely adjudicative function which is distinct from, and therefore not replicated 
by the Tribunal.  However, the operation of the NELHMC hearings and other positive experiences 
discussed in this section may have been the result of the governance arrangements within the 
organisations concerned at that particular time.  Equally, there may well be undesirable practices and 
instances of poor training in other organisations.192  The effectiveness of the s.23 power, whatever 
function is ascribed to it, will be dependent on the local constitutional arrangements, conventional 
practices and pro forma employed.  Information on these matters is not readily available. This difficulty 
arises because administration of the s.23 power is comprehensively devolved to individual 
organisations, and little information is available on the degree of consistency which exists between 
their practices nationally.  In consequence, broad, simplistic statements by either side as to the relative 
merits and demerits of the Managers’ process belie the evident complexity of such a decentralised 
mechanism.  Both the proponents and opponents of abolition fail to take account of the complexity 
of the system to which they have addressed their remarks.  This has been enabled by a lack of public 
understanding and a lack of data.  The true nature of the s.23 process remains hidden, and thus any 
attempt at legislative reform in this area will be hopelessly uninformed. 
VI CONCLUSION 
My observations in this paper may have offered incidental support to those opposed to the abolition 
of the s.23 discharge power, but it is hard not to also be critical of the proponents of retaining s.23 in 
its current form.  The Joint Committee noted that it is a characteristic of all aspects of mental health 
services that there is a lack of data on how they operate,193 and this is emphatically true in relation to 
the Managers.  The absence of data and wider understanding has contributed to a general lack of 
awareness, certainly in centrally organised legislative and public policy circles, as to just what the 
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Managers are, and what their function is.  This has, in turn, allowed the weakly supported arguments 
made by both sides to go largely unchallenged. 
In view of the lack of examination of the more principled issues at stake in the s.23 process where 
reform has been considered in the past, much of the discussion above has only been able to reflect 
upon the extent to which suitable evidence can be found to justify the claim that s.23 complies with 
or contravenes the core function of any review mechanism; an assessment of the probity of decision 
making.  The inability of the evidence to support discussion beyond this largely procedural question, 
such that it might consider questions of, inter alia, legitimacy and access to justice, demonstrates the 
failure of both proponents or opponents of abolition to engage with the substantive issues raised by 
the s.23 process.  Indeed, the argument around expertise, independence and duplication has largely 
assumed that it is the primary, perhaps even the sole, function of the Managers to protect the liberty 
of the person subject to compulsory care, and that this is best achieved by a review of the criteria to 
be satisfied to justify the imposition of a compulsory order.  The failure of Parliament and others to 
articulate and justify the function of the Managers means that alternative possibilities have never been 
examined.  This perhaps also explains why the question of whether the Managers’ s.23 power should 
be retained or abolished has been presented as a binary choice to be made in the shadow of the 
Tribunal, and conducted in a way which ignores the evident complexity of the situation, and 
seriousness of the subject matter concerned. 
Precisely what the Managers should be is a different question to that which I have addressed in this 
paper.  We can speculate as to the other functions which an independent review mechanism could 
fulfil.  If it were construed as purely a mechanism for protecting liberty, then the existence of a less 
formal, more accessible, independent process like the Managers’ could be said to relieve some of the 
burden that would otherwise fall on the Tribunal; diminishing, rather than duplicating the work of the 
Tribunal.  If the Managers’ are to be distinguished from the Tribunal, then a community membership 
might be claimed to offer a means of regulating the behaviour of clinicians by exposing professional 
norms to community values.  This would have parallels with the role of juries and the magistracy 
elsewhere in the legal system. 
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As well as providing protection to individuals subject to compulsory care, the mechanism could also 
provide protection for individual organisations delegating the s.23 power.194  For example, by ensuring 
decision-making is internally consistent.  It could also be said to protect organisations from poor 
decisions by care professionals leading to unlawful compulsory care, and that the compulsory order in 
place represents the least restrictive option available.  One way in which the Managers might guarantee 
compulsory care is appropriate is by utilising their power to call a hearing on their own initiative to 
monitor those subject compulsion over a period of time outside of the s.20 renewal process and 
without a patient request, to follow up on actions proposed by the clinical team in previous hearings.  
However, whether the Managers could be of more specific benefit to either individuals subject to 
compulsory care or to the compelling organisations in the ways outlined above is not something that 
can be answered using the available evidence.195   
Notwithstanding their apparent invisibility,196 the Managers constitute a significant component of the 
mental health review system.197  Despite this, I have shown that there have been regular attempts to 
reform this aspect of the law without regard for the almost complete lack of evidence to justify such 
action, and thus little or no understanding of how the Managers operate, what works well, and what 
we could eliminate or modify.  Given the disempowerment and loss of autonomy entailed by subjecting 
a person to compulsory care, notwithstanding the good intentions connected with this action, the 
failure to understand the mechanisms by which individuals can productively engage with and also 
challenge their care is to be deplored.  Similarly, the failure to develop a better understanding of this 
process entails a failure to develop standards of good practice as regards the conduct of the s.23 
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process and ancillary operations (such as the training of Managers).  By extension, this permits poor 
practice to continue and prevents the sharing of best practice.  This is unprofessional and unethical.  
Not only is it problematic from a principled point of view, poor practice on the part of the Managers 
in the conduct of hearings, and any failure to provide adequate reasons may also contravene public 
law principles, such as reasonableness and proportionality.  This increases the possibility of legal 
challenges to the decisions of the Managers at unnecessary cost to the public purse. 
Whatever the particular motivations of those in favour of abolition, which is a separate matter, the 
claims of both sides have been shown to be insufficiently robust in terms of either their data or 
underlying principled position.  The only means to remedy this situation is a comprehensive effort on 
the part of users and observers of the s.23 process, as well as legislators and the government, to 
consolidate what existing local data there is and to increase our understanding of this fundamental 
aspect of the 1983 Act.  Our current collective understanding of the process is no basis upon which 
to conduct further reform of the law in this area. 
 
